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The tradition of having a live bear on the sideline at Baylor football games dates back to the early s. The men of the th Engineers, a unit of the 32nd Infantry Division that was stationed in Waco at the time, had a pet bear named Ted. When the th got its shipping orders, it was thought to be too much to put Ted Bear in a private's uniform and take him along. So Ted was donated to the athletic department. For seven decades now, the Baylor football team has been represented by Ted's successors although the tradition of naming them "Judge" was born in In the long history of Baylor football, there is no season more connected with Baylor glory.

Judge McCall was very grateful to have the Baylor Bear named in his honor. Every two years a new mascot is brought to campus. This year, though, there are a pair of Baylor Bears on the sidelines. The Baylor Chamber of Commerce, a campus service fraternity, is responsible for the bears and maintaining the Bear Plaza, where they are kept. The job of bear keeper is a rather honored position on the Baylor campus and the bear handlers put the cubs through a strenuous training program before putting them in the act.

Kipp says a bear will do almost anything for an Oreo. But the bears' favorite reward is Dr Pepper. They'll drink 'em at 10, 2 and 4 and just about any other time. I don't know what ingredient Dr Pepper has in it, but bears sure go for it. Kids also go for the bears. Young Baylor fans like to come down and pet the bears and the bears seem to enjoy performing for the crowds.

I also found, in a previous life as a modeling instructor, that a DP and some peanut butter crackers from the vending machine at our studio made a nice lunch.


Dad has carried that bottle around for four decades now. His favorite was Dr Pepper floats with vanilla ice cream. But, as he became a culinary king, he realized the unique, sweet flavor, was also great for meat and pork glazes. People loved it. Wiley , recently of Yelapa Playa Mexicana. And it was great on a pork shoulder. This born and raised Houstonian also loves the DP glaze with mustard oil drizzled on a salad of greens with beef capriccio. Which made me Google it, and yes, there are recipes for Dr Pepper burgers out there.

And I'm certainly going to try them.


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Live Music Now. By Johnston Farrow. October theater. By Tarra Gaines. By Steven Devadanam. Pet of the Week. By Ken Hoffman. In any event, the claim of predatory pricing cannot scale the hurdle erected by Brunswick, supra. The fact is that the so-called predatory pricing began more than a year previous to LCC's acquisition of the Wilcox franchise. Therefore, it cannot be said that any injury to Bayou "flowed" from an antitrust violation.

How to make a flaming dr pepper

The gist of this and the entirety of plaintiff's complaint seems to be simple: LCC's gain is Bayou's loss. Bayou laments not only the fact that they were unable to buy the Dr Pepper franchise; but also the fact that the franchise was acquired by their arch rival LCC.

It is the opinion of the court that this quixotic tilt at the windmill of competition demonstrates that the plaintiff is seeking relief which the antitrust laws simply are not designed to provide. It is not the duty of this court to require store owners to accord greater shelf space to a less popular product, to force LCC to promote their competitor's wares in their own vending machines and coolers, to forbid the Dr Pepper company from encouraging alignment with the most efficient bottler willing to purchase their franchise, to dictate the policy of the national Coca-Cola Company in the granting of its franchises, to underwrite the excursions into the marketplace of new products Dr.

Nut , or to prohibit LCC from underselling its competitors.

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In short the court is not obliged, under the facts of this case, to engage in affirmative action. In each request, Bayou asks the court to protect a competitor, not competition. We find the record to be devoid of evidence of intent to bring about a monopoly.

Monopoly is the power to fix prices and exclude competition. United States v.

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  • Competition is alive and well in the Lake Charles soft drink industry; the consumer is given a wide range of choices in selecting his desired beverage. The court cannot force him to choose a brand for which Bayou holds the franchise. The fact is that Bayou possesses the same market share as they did prior to the acquisition. Bayou would have suffered the same lost revenues and cost efficiencies no matter who acquired the Dr Pepper franchise. Bayou's injuries do not flow from the fact that LCC has a greater market share; they flow from the fact that competition has precluded Bayou from achieving the position they desire.

    This is not the type of injury that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent, even if a violation of such laws were shown. Many of the cases cited by the plaintiff involve suits brought by the government to enjoin the merger of businesses on the ground that such merger might operate so as to restrain trade. However, this is a suit by a private plaintiff, and Section 4 of the Clayton Act is a remedial statute providing treble damages to any person "who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything in the antitrust laws.

    Brunswick rejected the idea that mere violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act gives rise to a damages claim under Section 4. Truett Payne Co. Chrysler Motors Corp. Proof of antitrust injury is an essential element of the plaintiff's claim; absent such proof, plaintiff can claim no relief. There is no need to consider whether there were violations of the antitrust laws if there is no antitrust injury. Purex Corp.

    Computer Products v. Business Machines, F. In conclusion, therefore, the court finds that the defendants' motions must be granted for the reason that the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that any injury causally related to an antitrust violation has been suffered by the plaintiff. Pretermitting the question of whether the acquisition of the Wilcox franchise by LCC might operate so as to restrain trade, this paper chase is nonetheless at an end, since the plaintiff is unable to establish the above stated essential element of its claim.

    In addition, Bayou also sells Dr Pepper and other products in fountain syrup form. The soft drinks are manufactured by the grocery chains themselves or by contract bottlers or canners. The best known warehouse brand is Shasta. Even legitimate price decreases will necessarily have a non-remunerative effect upon other firms in the market. These decreases will reduce competitors' profit margins and they may drive the inefficient firm out of business while the firm which originally reduced prices continues to make a profit.

    It is the very nature of competition that the vigorous, efficient firm will drive out less efficient firms. This is not proscribed by the antitrust laws. Thus we must exercise great care in differentiating between legitimate price competition and that "predatory pricing" which constitutes a restraint of trade. Janich Bros. Star Machinery Co. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor This statute confers standing to sue only upon those persons causally injured by antitrust violations Moreover, in order to prevail the plaintiff must prove not only injury causally linked to the asserted violation, but also that the injury is the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent The plaintiff's burden of proving the former is satisfied by proof of some damage flowing from the antitrust violation Satisfying the latter burden is dependent on a showing that the injury was caused by a reduction, rather than an increase, in competition flowing from the defendant's acts, since "[t]he antitrust laws Accordingly, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was intended to or did have some anticompetitive effect beyond his own loss of business or the market's loss of a competitor Moreover, it is not sufficient for an antitrust plaintiff to allege an indirect ripple effect.

    Olympia Brewing Co. It is not enough to confer standing that plaintiff just prove some injury and show that this injury is within the affected area of the economy.


    Antitrust violations admittedly create many foreseeable ripples of injury to individuals, but the law has not allowed all of these merely affected by the ripples to sue for treble damages. Pepper Co. Bayou Bottling, Inc. July 15, Propriety of granting the motion for summary judgment : The plaintiff in this case has offered argument in support of the proposition that summary judgment is particularly inappropriate in antitrust cases.

    Texaco, Inc. The Supreme Court said that it should be used sparingly in antitrust cases. And it is not a substitute for trial.

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    • All ambiguities and all reasonable inferences, it is frequently said, must be resolved in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. And it is also said that the claimant need not, at the outset, submit probative evidence in support of his position.

      The moving party has the burden of showing on the basis of admissible evidence, from persons with personal knowledge of the facts, that there is no genuine issue for trial as to any material fact. The authors go on to say that mere allegations in a complaint or defensive pleading are insufficient to resist summary judgment and that the party opposing the motion must offer probative evidence to support his claim.

      The party opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to the benefit only of reasonable inferences that may be drawn in its favor Some scrutiny is thus required to determine whether the facts are susceptible of the interpretation which Southway the plaintiff seeks to give them in light of the defendants' evidence contradicting Southway's allegations The court discussed the Lawlor case, above, noting This court held that an accumulation of exclusive licenses is not a violation of the Sherman Act because a rival film accessory distributor could always compete against National Screen for subsequent contracts with motion picture producers.

      Similarly, in our case, Fleer or any other trading card manufacturer, may compete with Topps for minor league players or even persuade the present major league players not to renew their Topps' contracts. However, these two cases involve a characteristic not present in the instant lawsuit. In both cases, the licenses involved products which do not compete against each other.

      It is alleged that Hallmark cards are the leading brand of greeting cards and that customers wishing to purchase them will take their business only to a store handling Hallmark products. But this does not make the exclusive distributorship invidious or unlawful. There is no claim here that there is not a substantial market for the sale of cards produced by Hallmark's competitors Thus the plaintiff does not allege that interbrand competition is affected in any way by the Hallmark exclusive distributorship arrangements with Stationer's.

      The Klor's case involved a conspiracy between a large number of nationally known appliance manufacturers and distributors and Broadway-Hale Stores, a retail distributor of appliances and a competitor of Klor's, to refuse to sell to Klor's or to sell only at discriminatory prices. There are indications that Broadway-Hale extracted the agreement by use of its monopoly buying power. Thus the Klor's case involved a predatory conspiracy with both horizontal and vertical elements directed at a single competitor with the purpose of driving that competitor from the field by foreclosing all sources of supply.

      Anticompetitive effects a. As to future sales, Bayou Bottling's claim may be expressed either in terms of discounted present value or loss of present capital value i. To establish damages, respondents attempted to show that had petitioner allowed the defaulting centers to close, respondents' profits would have increased.

      Intermeshing a statutory prohibition against acts that have a potential to cause certain harms with a damages action intended to remedy those harms is not without difficulty. Respondents contend that the only additional element they need demonstrate is that they are in a worse position than they would have been had petitioner not committed those acts. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding compensable any loss "causally linked" to "the mere presence of the violator in the market.

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      Brunswick Corp. Because this holding divorces antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws without a clear statutory command to do so, we cannot agree with it. Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether lawful or unlawful, has the potential for producing economic readjustments that adversely affect some persons. But Congress has not condemned mergers on that account; it has condemned them only when they may produce anticompetitive effects. Both of these consequences are well illustrated by the facts of this case.

      If the acquisitions here were unlawful, it is because they brought a "deep pocket" parent into a market of "pygmies. Respondents would have suffered the identical "loss" but no compensable injury had the acquired centers instead obtained refinancing or been purchased by "shallow pocket" parents, as the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged, F. Thus, respondents' injury was not of "the type that the statute was intended to forestall.

      At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration. The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors. Of course, Congress is free, if it desires to mandate damages awards for all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers despite the peculiar consequences of so doing. But because of these consequences, "we should insist upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose," before attributing such an intent to Congress.